Memory card read terminals comprise, in addition to a memory card reader, a certain number of components such as a keypad, a screen, one or more processors, memory, a source of electrical power. For several years now, there has been a great increase in the functions of memory card read terminals. This is especially true for payment terminals. In addition to the payment function, the terminals embed networked communications functions, functions for detecting contactless memory cards, token management functions (for example for loyalty tokens), etc.
In addition to the great increase in such ancillary functions, memory card reader terminals must be resistant to various attacks or attempts at fraud to which they are frequently subjected. International standards have been promulgated to achieve homogeneity in the resistance of terminals to attacks. For example, in the field of payment the PCI PED (Payment Card Industry—Pin Entry Device) standard lays down requirements in terms of intrusion and detection of attempted attacks on terminals. These are not the only standards prevailing today.
However, because of these standards, terminals which were hitherto relatively unprotected are gradually being replaced by increasingly secured terminals. Among the points related to the securing of terminals, industrial firms in the sector are more particularly concerned with protecting the integrated circuit reader. The integrated circuit reader indeed is the weak link of the integrated circuit read terminal. This is because the integrated circuit reader has a slot for the insertion of the integrated circuit and this slot makes the interior of the terminal accessible from the exterior. More particularly, attackers try to obtain access to the integrated circuit. The integrated circuit connector is the part of the integrated circuit reader that comes into contact with the chip or the microprocessor embedded in the integrated circuit. When an attacker succeeds in gaining access to this integrated circuit connector without anyone being aware of it, he can intercept and read data exchanged between the chip or the microprocessor of the card and the processor of the integrated circuit read terminal. The intercepted data includes especially the secret code entered by the customer when the secret code is requested. This secret code can be carried without encryption on certain smartcards.
This explains why much effort has been spent on securing the integrated circuit reader. Thus, for example, integrated circuit readers have been provided with a lattice-based protection. This protection prevents insertion being done through the drilling of the terminal. When an object tries to penetrate the protective enclosure, a short circuit is produced, putting the terminal out of operation.
Referring to FIG. 1, a description is provided of a classic assembly of an integrated circuit reader. This integrated circuit reader comprises an integrated circuit reader 10, comprising a slot for inserting an integrated circuit 11. The integrated circuit connector is directly integrated into the integrated circuit reader. It has pins 12 for connection to the printed circuit board (PCB) 13 (partial view). The PCB 13 also comprises electronic components 14. The memory card reader 10 is protected by being covered with a complete protection 15 as well as a front protection 15b. 
In order to resolve the problems posed by memory card readers, it has been proposed to separate the integrated circuit connector and the body of the integrated circuit connector into two distinct functional units.
Such a separation makes it possible to propose novel measures for securing both the integrated circuit connector and the body of the integrated circuit reader itself.
However, the goal of attaining maximum securing for the terminals makes it necessary to have an integrated circuit connector (chip connector) that can meet the new requirements of the industry. Indeed, a novel type of fraud has to be coped with. This fraud is illustrated with reference to FIG. 2. In this fraud, a partially insulated metal blade LM is inserted beneath the integrated circuit connector at the level of the connection blades. (A connection blade is a metal blade comprising a connection portion 22 which comes into contact with the mother board of the integrated circuit reader, a contact zone 21 which comes into contact with the integrated circuit and a linking portion 23 connecting the contact zone 21 and the connection portion 22.) The insertion of this metal blade LM makes it possible to sense those connection blades that are activated and to intercept the data transmitted between the terminal and the smartcard.
There is therefore a need to provide an architecture of integrated circuit connector that is intrinsically secured and does not require any complementary protection.